By Tanya Metaksa
What’s New — United States of America v. Curtis Squire; Fifth Circuit has granted rehearing en banc; Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. v. Bondi, Case No. 4:24‑cv‑00565: a win for 2A; District Court:
Brown v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, United States Department of Justice, and Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi, a frontal Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act’s remaining registration regime for suppressors and short‑barreled rifles.
SCOTUS
Although SCOTUS is on its summer recess, summer order lists are scheduled to be issued on Monday, Aug. 17; and Friday, Sept. 4. Summer order lists usually consist of actions taken by the Court on motions in pending cases, petitions for rehearing, and other miscellaneous matters. Emergency orders, such as in applications for stays, will continue to be released as required.
Courts of Appeal
Louisiana: Fifth Circuit
United States of America v. Curtis Squire; Case No. 25‑30324: Docketed: May 28, 2025; Decision filed: June 2, 2026: Petition for rehearing en banc: June 16, 2026: En banc granted and Opinion Vacated: July 20, 2026.
United States v. Squire is a felon‑in‑possession prosecution from the Eastern District of Louisiana, now on appeal in the Fifth Circuit as a Second Amendment and Commerce Clause test case concerning 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
District Court: Case No. 2:24‑CR‑41‑1:
- Squire’s indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was returned in the original 2024 criminal case after New Orleans police found a handgun in his home during a shooting investigation; state charges related to the shooting were dropped, but the federal felon‑in‑possession charge remained.
- The district court denied Squire’s motion to dismiss the indictment (including his Bruen‑based Second Amendment challenge), then proceeded to accept his guilty plea and sentence him.
- On March 8, 2024, Squire was charged in a single-count federal indictment with possessing a firearm and ammunition after being convicted of a felony offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged that Squire had prior felony convictions in two state cases.
US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Case No. 25‑30324: Docketed: May 28, 2025; Decision filed: June 2, 2026: Decision vacated July 20, 2026.
- On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel framed “a novel question” whether the Second Amendment protects a convicted drug trafficker from dispossession of a firearm in his home and held that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Squire, permissibly disarms him based on dangerousness rather than location and is consistent with historical tradition.
- The court thus affirmed his conviction and rejected his Bruen challenge, concluding that felon‑in‑possession prohibitions remain valid at least as applied to drug traffickers.
- Once the appeal for an en banc panel was accepted, the first panel opinion was vacated, and the full Fifth Circuit has granted rehearing en banc in No. 25‑30324 to consider Squire’s facial Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1), potentially reshaping the doctrinal basis for federal felon‑in‑possession prosecutions.
That doctrinal basis for the en banc order
The en banc order notes that Squire’s case began as a Second Amendment as‑applied challenge but has now been reframed to raise a facial Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g), in direct response to Justice Thomas’s recent invitation in United States v. Hemani.
How United States v. Hemani influences this case
- In United States v. Hemani, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the federal “unlawful user of a controlled substance” gun ban, § 922(g)(3), as applied to a regular marijuana user who kept a firearm at home for self‑defense.
- Justice Gorsuch’s opinion held that the Second Amendment does not allow the government to automatically strip gun rights from otherwise law‑abiding adults just because they use marijuana, without evidence that they are dangerous or violent. Writing separately,
- Justice Thomas agreed with that result but went further, warning that § 922(g) may exceed Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because it treats any gun that once moved in interstate commerce as a basis for federal criminal jurisdiction. He explicitly invited lower courts to reexamine whether Congress may criminalize simple firearm possession untethered to actual economic activity—a call the Fifth Circuit picked
up in Squire, where the en banc court will now consider whether the felon‑in‑possession ban itself can be justified as a regulation of commerce.
Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. v. Bondi, Case No. 4:24‑cv‑00565: This case is a Second Amendment challenge to the federal ban on firearms in post offices and on postal property under 18 U.S.C. 930(a) and 39 C.F.R. 232.1(l). After about a year of litigation, Judge Reed O’Connor (N.D. Tex.) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on Sept. 30, 2025, holding the ban unconstitutional as applied to carrying firearms in ordinary post offices and on postal property, and issuing a permanent injunction protecting FPC, SAF, and their members.
The court found no historical tradition supporting such a restriction, reasoning that the Founders themselves did not prohibit firearms in post offices and that the government failed its burden under the Second Amendment framework. The ruling enjoins federal enforcement of the ban against the plaintiffs.
In March of this year, Judge O’Connor denied a DOJ motion to narrow or undo the ruling, leaving the injunction intact. The case remained on appeal before the Fifth Circuit until on July 16, 2026, the DOJ filed an unopposed Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss the Appeal. The Second Amendment Foundation, one of the challengers in this case, reported that the Post Office Carry Ban Stands.
District Court
Brown v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, United States Department of Justice, and Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi, with organizational plaintiffs National Rifle Association of America, Firearms Policy Coalition, Second Amendment Foundation, and American Suppressor Association; Case No. 4:25‑cv‑01162‑SRC; Filed: Aug. 1, 2025. TheComplaint challenges NFA suppressor and short‑barreled rifle registration requirements under the Second Amendment.
Case posture and core claims
Brown v. ATF is a frontal Second Amendment challenge to the National Firearms Act’s remaining registration regime for suppressors and short‑barreled rifles following Congress’s elimination of the traditional $200 transfer and making taxes in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025. Plaintiffs—individuals, a Missouri firearms retailer, and major national gun‑rights organizations—contend that suppressors and short‑barreled rifles are “arms” protected by the Second Amendment’s plain text and are today possessed by law‑abiding citizens for lawful purposes, including self‑defense, sporting use, and hearing protection. Under Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, they contend that the NFA’s suppressor and short‑barreled‑rifle registration rules function as a categorical ban or severe burden on keeping and bearing these arms.
The complaint and subsequent summary‑judgment briefing frame the Bruen inquiry in two steps: first, whether the challenged NFA scheme regulates “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” as understood in Heller, and second, if so, whether DOJ can justify the modern registration regime by pointing to founding‑era or Reconstruction‑era analogues.
After the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Wolford v. Lopez, Hemani, and Landor, the district court ordered supplemental briefing addressing how those holdings affect the Bruen analysis and the federal government’s ability to rely on its taxing power to sustain the NFA. Plaintiffs and supporting organizations, including SAF and ASA, have argued that Wolford clarifies that “plain text” analysis is a linguistic inquiry and that common‑use/dangerous‑and‑unusual questions belong at the historical‑tradition stage, with the government bearing the burden. DOJ’s July 27 supplemental brief, which has been criticized by Mark W. Smith, takes the contrary view that Wolford does not disturb existing Eighth Circuit precedent.
Doctrinal tensions and circuit splits
Brown v. ATF sits squarely in the emerging post‑Bruen and Wolford conflicts over how to treat “in common use” and “dangerous and unusual” within the text‑and‑history framework and over the constitutionality of NFA‑style regimes for particular classes of firearms and accessories. Some courts treat the common‑use question as part of Bruen’s initial plain‑text inquiry, which shrinks the set of covered “arms” and eases the government’s burden later; others—such as the Third and Seventh Circuits in Cheeseman and Barnett—treat common use as a historical question at Bruen’s second step, requiring the government to prove that a particular arm was historically viewed as dangerous and unusual before excluding it from Second Amendment protection.
The Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Wolford and the concurring opinion emphasizing the prohibition on “smuggling” historical limits into the plain‑text stage intensifies this tension. Brown provides a vehicle for testing whether lower courts will realign their Bruen methodology accordingly. On the regulatory front, there is also divergence over registration and licensing schemes: while many courts have upheld discretionary licensing for public carry, universal registration of all lawfully possessed firearms has faced sharper skepticism, especially in light of Heller II’s analysis and the lack of founding‑era analogues. Brown extends that critique specifically to NFA registration for suppressors and short‑barreled rifles, arguing that Congress’s removal of the tax component undermines any claim that the statute can be justified as an exercise of the taxing power rather than as a direct restriction on arms.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wolford—and a concurrence warning courts not to “smuggle” historical limits into the plain‑text stage—sharpens this methodological tension and makes Brown a test case for whether lower courts will adjust their Bruen analysis. Brown pushes that critique directly at NFA registration of suppressors and short‑barreled rifles by arguing that Congress’s removal of the tax component undercuts any claim that the statute is merely an exercise of the taxing power rather than a direct restriction on arms.
Upcoming steps and strategic significance
As of late July 2026, the major briefing and oral argument have been completed, and the case awaits a ruling on the pending summary‑judgment motions. Depending on how Judge Clark resolves the text‑and‑history questions, any party dissatisfied with the outcome is likely to file a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit, where the court’s prior precedents on common use and NFA regulations will be tested against the Supreme Court’s newest guidance.
First of many
From a strategic perspective, Brown is one of several coordinated NFA cases (including Jensen and Roberts) designed by SAF, FPC, NRA, and ASA to produce either a favorable circuit‑level ruling or a clean vehicle for Supreme Court review on the status of suppressors and short‑barreled rifles under the Second Amendment. A pro‑plaintiff decision on summary judgment would provide immediate relief from registration obligations for the plaintiffs and potentially invite broader challenges to similar regimes, while an adverse ruling would crystallize the doctrinal tension and strengthen the case for en banc rehearing or certiorari. In either posture, Brown is poised to contribute significantly to the ongoing national debate over whether modern NFA‑style registration of commonly owned arms is compatible with Heller, McDonald, Bruen, and the Court’s recent clarification of text‑and‑history methodology.
