By Tanya Metaksa
What’s New—Summary of Glock switches lawsuits; US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: Koons v. Platkin: New Jersey: Third Circuit: Koons v. NJ Attorney General: Case No.: 23-1900: En banc Appeal is granted, hearing set for Feb. 11, 2026;
“Glock switches” lawsuits
Anti-Second Amendment groups, including Everytown for Gun Safety, Giffords Law Center, and Moms Demand Action, have filed lawsuits and launched public campaigns against Glock since early 2024. They allege that the company’s pistol designs are easily converted into illegal machine guns using “Glock switches” (auto sears). These groups claim Glock has known about the vulnerability for decades but refused to make design changes to protect profits, which they say has contributed to rising gun violence. Glock switches, illegal under federal law since the 1930s and further restricted in 1986, allow semi-automatic pistols to fire continuously.
Individual Legal Actions
Chicago filed the first lawsuit (No. 2024CH02216) in March 2024 with Everytown Law and Motley Rice, targeting Glock and local retailers for public nuisance and product liability; a federal judge allowed it to proceed in state court, and the case is ongoing. Parallel claims under Chicago Municipal Code § 2‑25‑090(a), which treats ICFA‑type violations as municipal code violations, along with a public nuisance theory based on substantial, unreasonable interference with public health, safety, and use of public spaces.
Minnesota (No. 27‑CV‑24‑19940, December 2024, AG Ellison with Giffords) and New Jersey (Case No. ESX‑C‑000286‑24) sued similarly, with Minnesota (Court/File No.: 27‑CV‑24‑19940) defeating Glock’s motion to dismiss in August 2025. Baltimore and Maryland (Case No. C‑24‑CV‑25‑001450, February 2025), along with Seattle (Case No.: 25‑2‑15457‑1, SEA, September 2025), raise the last claims linking converted Glocks to local crimes.
Latest developments
By October 2025, Glock reportedly agreed to phase out modifiable pistols by November 30, following pressure from these lawsuits and groups like Everytown. A coalition of 14 state attorneys general and D.C.. supported preserving documents in 2024. Second Amendment rights groups responded with lawsuits against California laws restricting “Glock-style” handguns.
Counterarguments
Glock and allies argue that the suits hold manufacturers liable for criminal misuse of legal products after sale, potentially violating protections like PLCAA. A 2024 House Oversight probe examined possible Biden administration collusion with anti-gun plaintiffs in the Chicago case. All major lawsuits remain pending as of late 2025.
A year ago, NSSF reacted to this onslaught of lawsuits by posting:
“This is clearly an abuse of the courts to attempt to circumvent the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA),” said Lawrence G. Keane, NSSF Senior Vice President and General Counsel. “Attorneys General Platkin and Ellison, along with the other colluding states, are attempting to extend the frivolous claims that have no foundation in law and abuse taxpayer dollars to advance an unconstitutional gun control agenda. These claims are a devious manipulation of the courts by attempting to force a gun control agenda through judicial fiat and are contrary to the will of lawmakers and are expressly prohibited by federal law. This is the very definition of ‘lawfare’ and should be rejected by the courts.”
Court of Appeals – Third Circuit
New Jersey: Third Circuit
Koons v. NJ Attorney General: Case No.: 23-1900
On December 11, 2025, a majority of the active judges having voted for rehearing en banc in the above-captioned cases, it is ordered that the petitions for rehearing are GRANTED. The Clerk of this Court shall list the cases for rehearing en banc. The opinion filed on September 10, 2025, amended on September 17, 2025, and the judgment entered on September 10, 2025, are hereby vacated. Authoring Judge: Chagares. [23-1900, 23-2043] (SB)
The calendar date for oral argument before the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is set for Feb. 11, 2026, with allotted argument time for Siegel Plaintiffs-Erin E. Murphy, 20 minutes, and Koons Plaintiff-Peter A. Patterson, 10 minutes.
Background and posture
Koons v. Attorney General New Jersey, No. 23‑1900 (3d Cir.), is a precedential appeal from preliminary injunction orders in consolidated Second Amendment challenges to New Jersey’s post‑Bruen carry law, Chapter 131. As of Dec. 15, the Third Circuit has issued a comprehensive merits opinion (filed Sept. 10, with a slightly revised combined opinion posted Sept. 17) largely upholding New Jersey’s “sensitive places” regime and several related carry restrictions, while affirming targeted injunctions against some provisions, including the default ban on carry on most private property, a ban on unsecured guns in vehicles, and a liability‑insurance mandate.
After Bruen invalidated New York’s “proper cause” requirement, New Jersey enacted Chapter 131, which removed its “justifiable need” standard but added new licensing conditions, mandatory liability insurance, enhanced fees, and a broad list of twenty‑five “sensitive places” where carrying is criminalized as a third‑degree offense. Two sets of plaintiffs (Koons and Siegel) brought § 1983 suits challenging these provisions and obtained preliminary injunctions from Judge Renée Bumb; the state (and legislative intervenors) appealed, producing a consolidated interlocutory appeal in Nos. 23‑1900 and 23‑2043.
Issues and legal framework
The panel (Krause, Porter, Chung, JJ.) framed the question as whether plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Second Amendment challenges under Bruen’s history‑and‑tradition test, as clarified by Rahimi. The opinion treats Bruen as requiring the state to identify regulations consistent with “principles” underlying historical firearm restrictions—especially in “sensitive places”—rather than exact historical twins, and it emphasizes that legislatures retain room to address modern gun‑violence problems so long as they do not “eviscerate” the core right of public carry.
Treatment of “sensitive places”
Relying on Heller, Bruen, Rahimi, and parallel post‑Bruen decisions from the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit holds that many categories in § 2C:58‑4.6(a) fit within a permissible sensitive‑places tradition. The court reads the historic acceptance of bans in legislative assemblies, polling places, courthouses, and similar venues as articulating a principle: firearms may be excluded from discrete locations devoted to specific civic or communal functions where weapons historically threatened peace or physical safety, and where the exclusion does not effectively nullify the general right to carry.
Provisions upheld versus enjoined
The panel reverses the district court’s broad preliminary injunction against most sensitive‑place designations, concluding plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success against several categories (such as schools, colleges, and core government facilities) and aligning New Jersey’s scheme with those sustained in Antonyuk, LaFave, and Wolford. At the same time, the court affirms or leaves in place preliminary relief against: (1) the default prohibition on carrying on private property open to the public absent express consent or signage (§ 2C:58‑4.6(a)(24)); (2) the ban on carrying loaded, unsecured firearms in vehicles (requiring unloading and locked storage) (§ 2C:58‑4.6(b)(1)); and (3) the $300,000 liability‑insurance requirement (§ 2C:58‑4.3(a)), all on the ground that the state’s historical analogues do not sufficiently justify these modern burdens under Bruen’s methodology.
Doctrinal significance:
Koons adopts a strongly principle‑driven reading of Bruen and Rahimi, rejecting a “history trapped in amber” approach and instructing district courts to focus on why and how a regulation burdens armed self‑defense in light of the historical tradition. For civil‑rights litigants, the opinion marks the Third Circuit’s leading post‑Bruen articulation of sensitive‑places doctrine and sets outer limits on private‑property defaults, vehicle‑carry restrictions, and financial conditions (fees and insurance) that can be imposed on the exercise of the right to carry handguns in public.
