By Tanya Metaksa
What’s New —SCOTUS: The U.S. Supreme Court met on Thursday, June 18, to discuss cases, and it announced a decision in United States v. Hemani. No decisions on the five main cases awaiting certiorari. Florida: Fourth Circuit; Eubanks v. State, Case No. 4D2025-169; The Court applied Bruen to the Florida age-based disqualification criteria and found it facially unconstitutional; California: Ninth Circuit, District Court: Lopez v. Los Angeles; Case No. 2:26‑cv‑06003, a June 2026 federal Second Amendment case challenging ordinances in Los Angeles and Inglewood that restrict handgun purchases to one every 30 days; California: Ninth Circuit, District Court; SAF v. Livingston: Case No. 4:26-cv-05996: The lawsuit disputes Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office policies regarding the terms and conditions for CCW permits issued under California law. Sheriff David Livingston enforces these policies, which are unique in the country.
SCOTUS
Calendar: The U.S. Supreme Court met on Thursday, June 18, to discuss cases and will announce those orders on June 22 at 9:30 am, matching the previous ones—none of the cases were on the list. Additionally, the Court may announce opinions on Tuesday, June 23, and Thursday, June 25, which is also the last scheduled conference day. The Court normally does not prepare an orders list at the end of a session; instead, it issues orders promptly. As of today, the Court has 25 Second Amendment cases remaining: Five Second Amendment policy cases, 16 under § 922(g)(1), 1 under § 922(g)(4), 1 under § 922(g)(5), 1 Mass Storage Law case, and 1 NY Licensing Regime case. It is possible that some of these cases will not be decided before summer recess.
The next term, 2026-2027, begins on Oct. 1, but the first conference will be Sept. 28, and the first orders announcement is scheduled for Oct. 1.
On June 18, the decision on the United States v. Hemani was announced.
United States v. Hemani, No. 24‑1234 (U.S. Sup. Ct.)
Decision
- On June 18, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) to a Texas man who used marijuana “every other day” violated the Second Amendment as applied, confirming the dismissal of his indictment. The Court determined that the government did not demonstrate that disarming a non-dangerous, casual user of an illegal drug aligns with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation under the Bruen/Rahimi framework. The opinion highlights its narrow scope, explicitly maintaining federal bans on felons, addicts, and individuals who are currently intoxicated, and allowing prosecutions where the government can prove dangerousness.
- Why it matters: This is the Court’s first merits decision applying Bruen to a status‑based federal disqualifier and will immediately reshape § 922(g)(3) prosecutions, inviting as‑applied challenges by marijuana users and litigation over what counts as “dangerous” drug use. Jurisdiction: Supreme Court of the United States. Date: June 18, 2026.
US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Florida: Fourth Circuit
Eubanks v. State, Case No. 4D2025-169; Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal | June 17, 2026, Judge Levine, J.; Kuntz, C.J., and Shaw, J., concurring
Overview
- The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals ruled that § 790.06(2)(b), Florida Statutes— which outright bans law-abiding adults aged 18 to 20 from getting a concealed carry license available to all other law-abiding adults—is facially unconstitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The court vacated appellant Jaylen Eubanks’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm, entered after a nolo contendere plea that preserved the right to appeal the motion to dismiss, which was denied.
Challenged Provision
- § 790.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. — The age-based disqualification functions as follows: Florida’s permitless carry law (§ 790.01) permits concealed carry for anyone who meets the criteria for a license under § 790.06. Subsection (2)(b) of § 790.06 establishes the minimum licensing age at 21, effectively blocking any lawful public carry — whether concealed or open — for law-abiding individuals aged 18 to 20. Importantly, the statute explicitly states that it “shall be liberally construed to carry out the constitutional right to bear arms.” § 790.06(16).
Practical Effect.
- An 18-year-old law-abiding adult in Florida — eligible to vote, to serve in the military, and recognized as an adult under § 743.07, Fla. Stat. — is nonetheless criminally liable for third-degree felony concealed carry while every other law-abiding adult 21 and over carries the same firearm without restriction.
Legal Theory and Constitutional Framework
- Step One — Plain Text:
- Under Bruen‘s two-step framework, the court first determines whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the conduct in question. The answer is clearly yes. “The people” as used in the Second Amendment “unambiguously refer[s] to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 580. Eighteen- to 20-year-olds are considered adults under Florida and federal law, fall within all other constitutional protections for “the people,” and were required by the Second Militia Act of 1792 to enroll in the militia — and arm themselves — upon turning 18. The plain text of the Second Amendment does not establish an age limit above 18, nor does any founding-era source support one.
- Step Two — Historical Tradition:
- Because the plain text presumptively protects the conduct, the burden shifted to the State to “demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. The State failed to carry that burden:
- No founding-era analogue categorically prohibits the public carry of firearms — concealed or open — by persons aged 18 to 20.
- The presumptively lawful regulatory categories identified in Heller (felons, the mentally ill, sensitive places, concealed carry bans applicable to all adults) do not encompass 18- to 20-year-olds as a class.
- Rahimi forecloses disarming a class of persons merely because they are alleged to be statistically “irresponsible” absent individualized findings of credible physical threat.
- While the Eleventh Circuit in NRA v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc), sustained a purchase restriction based on founding-era contract-incapacity of minors, the court distinguished that holding as addressing commercial acquisition, not the right to keep and bear arms already possessed.
- The Age-Evolution Principle.
- Paralleling Heller‘s rejection of limiting “arms” to 18th-century muskets, the Fourth DCA held that adulthood — like protected arms — is a living constitutional concept. Just as the definition of cognizable “arms” was not frozen at the founding, the definition of majority was not frozen at 21; today, Florida and federal law set majority at 18. An interpretation confining “the people” to those regarded as adults in 1791 would be the same “crabbed interpretation” Heller condemned.
Circuit Alignment
The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aligned with the majority of post-Bruen federal appellate authority:
| 8th Cir. | Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677 (2024) | Struck MN public carry ban on 18–20-year-olds |
| 3d Cir. | Lara v. Comm’r Penn. State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (2025) | Struck emergency-period carry ban on 18–20-year-olds |
| 5th Cir. | Reese v. ATF, 127 F.4th 583 (2025) | Found 18–20-year-olds within “the people” |
| 11th Cir. | NRA v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108 (2025) (en banc) | As-applied uphold of purchase restriction only; acknowledged 18–20-year-olds within “the people” |
Relief Granted
- The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and vacated Eubanks’s concealed carry conviction. The statute was declared facially unconstitutional as applied to 18- to 20-year-olds — meaning no set of circumstances exists under which § 790.06(2)(b) can constitutionally operate to disqualify that age cohort from the concealed carry available to all other law-abiding adults. The case was remanded with instructions.
Relevance to SAF v. Livingston
- Both Eubanks and SAF v. Livingston share the same constitutional core: a government actor has imposed a condition on the exercise of an otherwise valid right to carry — not on dangerous individuals, but on a specific class of law-abiding people — without a founding-era analogy to justify.
District Court
California: Ninth Circuit
Lopez v. Los Angeles; U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal., Case No. 2:26‑cv‑06003, filed June 3, 2026.
Challenged laws and core claim
- Lopez v. Los Angeles is a June 2026 federal Second Amendment case challenging ordinances in Los Angeles and Inglewood that restrict handgun purchases to one every 30 days. The case argues that these local restrictions are essentially the same as California’s statewide “one‑gun‑a‑month” law, which the Ninth Circuit has already struck down.
- Plaintiffs contend that these municipal “handgun rationing” measures are essentially the same as California’s statewide “one‑gun‑a‑month” law, which bans buying more than one firearm within 30 days.
- The complaint argues that, following the Ninth Circuit’s decision after Bruen to strike down California’s 1-in-30 rule, local laws similarly violate the Second Amendment because they impose “meaningful constraints” on the ability to acquire multiple firearms and lack any historical analog.
- In 2025, a Ninth Circuit panel declared California’s one‑gun‑per‑month law facially unconstitutional, emphasizing that the Second Amendment’s protection of “arms” includes both the possession and acquisition of multiple firearms, and that California could not cite a comparable historical tradition of rationing acquisition by time.
- Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to stop Los Angeles and Inglewood from enforcing their one‑handgun‑per‑30‑days purchase limits.
California: Ninth Circuit
SAF, Andrew W Moore and Janes Treul v. Contra County, filed 6/17/2026
SAF v. Livingston: Case No. 4:26-cv-05996, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Complaint filed June 2026.
Challenged Provisions and Legal Theory: The lawsuit contests Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office policies regarding the terms and conditions for CCW permits issued under California law. Sheriff David Livingston enforces these policies, which are unique in the country.
- Red dot sights and weapon-mounted lights:
- Sheriff David Livingston’s policies prohibit CCW permit holders from carrying handguns equipped with red dot optics or firearm-mounted flashlights — accessories commonly used by civilians and adopted by many California law enforcement agencies.
- Single-action-only pistol ban:
- The policies outright prohibit permit holders from carrying single-action-only (SAO) 1911- and 2011-style pistols, a platform with a history of use by civilians, military, and law enforcement for over a century and listed on the California Handgun Roster.
- Practical effect:
- Contra Costa County residents with valid California CCW permits — which are generally recognized statewide — are not allowed to carry equipment and firearms that permit holders from any other California county may legally carry within Contra Costa’s borders.
- Argument:
- The plaintiff argues that the Sheriff’s policies lack any basis in the country’s historical firearm regulations and therefore cannot meet the text-and-history standard set in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, making them unconstitutional under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint also cites District of Columbia v. Heller‘s defense of arms in common use for self-defense.
- Relief Sought: The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
- A statement that the Sheriff’s policies banning red dot sights, weapon-mounted lights, and SAO 1911/2011-style pistols violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.
- A permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of those policies against law-abiding Contra Costa County CCW permit holders.
