By Tanya Metaksa
What’s New — Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238, and Grant v. Higgins, No. 25-566: amicus briefs were filed bringing the total of all briefs to 87; On Oct. 30, 2026, Cutberto Viramontes the lead plaintiff in Viramontes v. Cook County filed a motion to withdraw from the case; Kentucky: Sixth Circuit: United States v. Laykovich, Case No. 25-5766; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Oct. 29 Federal; appeal from the Eastern District of Kentucky denied.
Weekly Second Amendment Developments — Week Ending Friday, October 30, 2026
The week’s most consequential judicial developments was the announcement that Cutberto Viramontes the lead plaintiff in Viramontes v. Cook County has filed a motion to withdraw from the case.
U. S. Supreme Court
On November 2 no orders list was issued by SCOTUS.
The next conference is Friday, Nov. 6. Duke lists 24 firearms-related petitions scheduled for consideration, predominantly challenges to the federal felon-in-possession prohibition or state equivalents. Being listed for conference does not mean the Court has granted review.
Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238, and Grant v. Higgins, No. 25-566—
Governments and private citizens/groups are filing amicus briefs defending semiautomatic-rifle bans, and as of Nov. 2, 87 distinct merits-stage amicus briefs filed or submitted for both the petitioners and the respondents.. Strictly counting only entries the Court’s docket labels “filed,” the merits-stage count is 76; another 11 are labeled “submitted.”
On X.com ,the headline read, Gun Rights Advocates Slam Amicus Briefs in AR-15 Ban Supreme Court Case. The Second Amendment Community is rightfully annoyed by what they are reading being filed by anti-2A proponents. However, the deadline for closing the acceptance of amicus briefs closed on October 28, so the deluge has subsided.
Mark W. Smith’s commentary in the past week
Smith has posted two videos about Viramontes. The first was his analysis of the case which includes the following points.
Common use is his decisive constitutional test. Smith reads United States v. Miller, District of Columbia v. Heller, and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen as establishing that governments cannot ban categories of arms commonly owned for lawful purposes. He emphasizes an important distinction: common use is sufficient to defeat a ban, but lack of common use does not necessarily establish that a weapon may be banned.
- Smith thinks the Court’s decision to hear the cases signals a desire to resolve the issue. Smith says the Court accepted the two challenges before a later Third Circuit decision created a circuit split. He interprets that sequence as evidence that the justices wanted to address what he views as lower courts’ resistance to Supreme Court precedent.
- He sees Justice Kavanaugh as a likely driving force. Smith highlights Kavanaugh’s 2011 dissent in Heller II, opposing the decision upholding Washington, D.C.’s semiautomatic-rifle ban. He predicts Kavanaugh will want that dissent’s approach adopted by the Supreme Court and might be given the majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts,
- He adds that taking two cases reduces the risk of mootness. Smith argues that accepting challenges from two jurisdictions makes it harder for officials to avoid a merits ruling by changing their laws, as happened in New York before Bruen. He also says the damages claim in Viramontes provides additional protection against mootness.
The second is his analysis about the request in the form of a motion by Cutberto Viramontes to withdraw personally from the Supreme Court challenge to Cook County’s assault-weapons ban. Smith believes that the motion by Viramontes to withdraw personally from the Supreme Court challenge to Cook County’s assault-weapons ban. In this video Smith reads that the motion expressly states that the motion “does not apply to any other petitioner” and that the case remains pending for the others. He also relays reporting that oral argument remains scheduled for Dec. 2.
Smith then reiterates what he has said several times, that multiple plaintiffs and two cases protect against such action.
He theorizes that the Court accepted both the Cook County and Connecticut challenges to reduce the risk that a single jurisdiction could prevent a merits decision by changing its law, comparing that possibility with New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York, where changes to the challenged restrictions led to mootness. This analysis of the Court’s motives is Smith’s analysis, not something he attributes to the justices.
Court’s Next Conference: According to Firearms Law Duke University SCOTUS Gun Watch November 2, 2026: “The Court’s next conference is scheduled for Friday, November 6. At that conference, the Justices presently plan to discuss 24 firearms-related cases: 17 challenges to 922(g)(1) or a state equivalent, one challenge to the federal prohibition on possession by persons under indictment, one to New York’s licensing regime, one to the federal prohibition on possession by noncitizens, two to state law restrictions for persons convicted of certain misdemeanors, one to the federal prohibition on conversion devices for assault weapons (which allow the weapon to fire 10 times with one pull of the trigger), and a process challenge involving the presumptions under Bruen’s two-step framework.”
U.S. Courts of Appeals
Kentucky – Sixth Circuit
United States v. Laykovich, Case No. 25-5766; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Oct. 29 | Federal; appeal from the Eastern District of Kentucky
The Sixth Circuit affirmed Alexander Laykovich’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), rejecting his facial Second Amendment challenge because the prohibition constitutionally applied to his circumstances: a prior judicial determination of dangerousness associated with mental illness, coupled with an available procedure for restoring firearm rights. Applying Bruen’s historical inquiry, the court found relevant analogues in laws permitting confinement and property restrictions for persons whose severe mental illness made them dangerous. The decision does not categorically approve disarming everyone with a mental-health diagnosis or resolve every application to persons who have recovered; it also explains that the means-end methodology of the circuit’s earlier Tyler decision no longer controls.
