By Tanya Metaksa
What’s New – SCOTUS-Next Conference scheduled for this Friday, April 17; NRA v. Glass: Case No. 24‑1185; A challenge to Florida’s law enacted after Parkland that prohibits 18- to 20-year-olds from buying firearms; Safari Club International v. Bonta: Finally the state of California has stopped delaying and is acknowledging that AB2571 is unconstitutional and is paying NRA’s attorney fees; Maine: First Circuit: Beckwith v. Frey: Decision dated April 3, upheld that Maine’s 72‑hour waiting period for firearm purchases does not implicate conduct protected by the “plain text” of the Second Amendment; New York: Second Circuit: Calce et al. v. City of New York et al: The court concludes plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that stun guns and tasers are “arms” within the Second Amendment’s protection; CA State Court: Poway Weapons & Gear, Inc. v. California Department of Tax and Fee Administration: The Motion for Summary Judgment is set for hearing on Aug. 25;
SCOTUS
Next Conference scheduled for April 17, 2026
New Case on the Certiorari List:
NRA v. Glass: Case No. 24‑1185; NRA v. Glass challenges Florida’s law enacted after Parkland that prohibits 18- to 20-year-olds from buying firearms. At the district court level, the Northern District of Florida upheld the law, finding it consistent with the Second Amendment even after Bruen, largely trusting Florida’s reliance on historical age‑based limits and deferring to public safety reasons.
On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit initially applied Bruen’s text-and-history test and still upheld the law, but the case then went on, where Chief Judge William Pryor’s majority opinion again upheld it. The court argued that 18- to 20-year-olds can be treated differently from older adults and that Founding Era analogs support setting categorical limits on young adults’ access to guns. This decision clearly differs from other circuits that recognize full Second Amendment protections for young adults, prompting the current petition for certiorari.
Mark W. Smith, a Second Amendment attorney (@FourBoxesDiner on X.com and the Four Boxes Diner on YouTube.com), who reviewed this case at the time of its petition, criticizes the en banc decision as a serious misapplication of Bruen. He compares that outcome with the Eighth Circuit’s Worth decision, which recognized full Second Amendment rights for 18- to 20-year-olds to carry firearms in Minnesota, and with similar pro-young-adult rulings in the Third and Fifth Circuits, thereby creating a multi-circuit split over whether young adults are treated as full “people” under the Second Amendment or effectively as children.
He contrasts that outcome with the Eighth Circuit’s Worth decision, which recognized full Second Amendment rights for 18- to 20-year-olds to carry firearms in Minnesota, and with similar pro‑young‑adult rulings in the Third and Fifth Circuits, thereby creating a multi-circuit split over whether young adults are considered full “people” under the Second Amendment or effectively as children. However, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Worth case (Jacobson v. Worth) on April 21, 2025, almost a month before NRA filed its certiorari petition.
The petition’s main argument is that the right to keep and bear arms belongs to all Americans, not just a specific group, and that in almost every state—including Florida—18‑year‑olds are considered legal adults who can vote, marry, sign contracts, and serve in the military. Yet, they are categorically barred from buying firearms in certain areas. NRA argues that this disagreement between circuits about whether states can broadly ban purchases by an entire age group is “intolerable” and requires Supreme Court review, especially because young adults in the Fifth Circuit can buy firearms while those in the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits cannot.
Smith examines why the Court denied cert in Worth but might grant it in Glass, arguing that Glass is a stronger case because it raises both the young-adult issue and a separate question about “ancillary” or “concomitant” rights: even though “purchase” or “acquire” do not appear in the Second Amendment’s text, the ability to acquire arms is logically necessary to exercise the rights to “keep” (possess) and “bear” (carry) them.
Much of the discussion in the NRA petition is dedicated to defending and solidifying the Bruen methodology—text first, burden on the government, then historical tradition—against attempts to reintroduce “interest balancing” or tiers of scrutiny through public-health-style cost-benefit analysis. He points out that the petition cites his own originalist scholarship for the idea that 1791, not 1868, is the key date for understanding the Second Amendment’s historical limits once it is incorporated against the states, and he sees that citation as strengthening the Court’s shift toward a 1791-based historical test. In conclusion, Smith hopes the Court will grant cert in NRA v. Glass, possibly along with other Second Amendment cases on semiautomatic rifle bans (e.g., “Snope”) and sensitive‑places restrictions (e.g., Wolford), and he predicts that with the Trump administration’s Solicitor General and Civil Rights Division leadership supporting pro‑2A positions, the government may soon urge the Court to hear more such cases.
U.S. Court of Appeals
California: Ninth Circuit
Safari Club International v. Bonta: No. 23‑15199: Safari Club International v. Bontachallenged California Assembly Bill 2571, which prohibited “firearm industry members” from advertising or marketing firearm-related products in a way “designed, intended, or reasonably appears to be attractive to minors,” backed by civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation and a private right of action in 2022. That was almost 4 years ago. Several years before we initiated the weekly Judicial Report.
Plaintiffs Safari Club International, Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation, Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, and So Cal Top Guns alleged the statute violated the First Amendment (commercial speech) and also implicated Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, particularly by chilling youth hunting, shooting, and hunter-education programs whose promotion could be deemed unlawful marketing to minors.
The district court initially denied a preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in light of its related decision in Junior Sports Magazines v. Bonta, holding that AB 2571’s restrictions on truthful, non-misleading firearms advertising did not directly and materially further the state’s asserted goals of reducing unlawful gun use by minors.
The state of California then initiated a delaying tactic, delaying and obfuscating the filing of a request for en banc review. Now, at long last, California has conceded the law was unconstitutional, and the Eastern District of California entered final judgment and a permanent injunction, with the state agreeing to pay roughly $481,000 in attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs and their NRA-supported legal team.
Maine: First Circuit
District Court Finding: Beckwith v. Frey: Case No. 1:24‑cv‑00384‑LEW (D. Me.). The Chief U.S. District Judge Lance E. Walker’s verdict (at the preliminary injunction stage) was a win for the plaintiffs. On Feb. 13, 2025, U.S. District Court Chief Judge Lance Walker for the District of Maine granted a preliminary injunction blocking the enforcement of Maine’s 72-hour waiting period law.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; Decision dated April 3 upheld that Maine’s 72‑hour waiting period for firearm purchases does not implicate conduct protected by the “plain text” of the Second Amendment and therefore survives at step one of the Bruen–Rahimi framework. It appears that anti-Second Amendment litigators are embracing an emerging doctrinal strategy: reframing certain regulations (especially acquisition-focused measures like waiting periods) as outside the Second Amendment’s coverage, effectively insulating them from Bruen’s demanding historical inquiry.
New York: Second Circuit
District Court Finding: Calce et al. v. City of New York et al: Case No. 1:21‑cv‑08208. Judge Ramos’s March 24, 2025 Opinion & Order denies plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grants the City’s cross‑motion, upholding New York City’s prohibition on civilian stun‑gun and taser possession.
Challenge:
Plaintiffs—several city residents plus SAF and FPC—brought a § 1983 challenge to state and city laws barring private possession and (for the City) sale of stun guns, arguing the bans violate the Second Amendment. After reciting the parties, statutes, and procedural posture, the court applies the summary‑judgment standard to cross‑motions, relying on the parties’ Rule 56.1 submissions.
Finding:
On the merits, the court concludes plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that stun guns and tasers are “arms” within the Second Amendment’s protection because they failed to demonstrate that these electronic weapons are in “common use” for lawful purposes. Treating “common use” as part of the threshold coverage inquiry, the court holds that, absent sufficient evidence on that point, the Second Amendment does not presumptively protect the devices, and the City is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court therefore does not grant plaintiffs’ requested declaratory and injunctive relief, orders the motions terminated, and directs the clerk to close the case.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: Case No. 25‑861: The three-judge panel, authored by Judge Lohier, published its opinion on April 13.
Finding:
They followed Judge Ramos’s opinion and supported his “in common use” test as part of Bruen step one (plain-text coverage), thereby placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove that stun guns and tasers are used in common for lawful purposes before the government must justify the ban based on historical context. This decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent from both Heller’s definition of “arms” as anything usable offensively or defensively and Caetano’s 2016 decision that explicitly recognized stun guns as protected arms.
State Court
California State Court
Poway Weapons & Gear, Inc. v. California Department of Tax and Fee Administration: Case No. 37-2024-00031147-CU-MC-CTL (formerly Jaymes v. Maduros / Case No. 25CV018964 (refiled))
Filed July 2, 2024 (original complaint), Superior Court of California, County of San Diego; refiled August 11, 2025, Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. On April 8, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that California’s 11-percent firearms excise tax violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Motion for Summary Judgment is set for hearing on Aug. 25.
Issue
Plaintiffs—licensed firearms retailers who sell firearms, firearm precursor parts, and ammunition to law-abiding Californians, joined by the Second Amendment Foundation, Firearms Policy Coalition, the California Rifle & Pistol Association, and the National Rifle Association of America—bring this civil-rights action to vindicate the constitutional right of the people to acquire arms free from discriminatory, punitive state taxation. The central question is whether California’s Assembly Bill 28, which imposes a special 11-percent excise tax on the retail sale of firearms, firearm precursor parts, and ammunition, but not on the sale of any other lawful consumer goods, violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Challenged Provisions
Plaintiffs challenge California Revenue and Taxation Code section 36011 et seq., enacted through Assembly Bill 28 (Chapter 231, Statutes of 2023), the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Act, which became operative July 1, 2024. The statute imposes an 11-percent excise tax on the gross receipts from the retail sale of any firearm, firearm precursor part, or ammunition sold by licensed firearms dealers, firearms manufacturers, and ammunition vendors in California. The tax is formally levied on sellers, but—as the Legislature’s own committee record acknowledges—it is passed through to individual purchasers as a higher retail price, making every Californian who buys a firearm or a box of ammunition pay an 11-percent premium, stacked on top of the State’s preexisting 7.25-percent sales tax, solely for exercising a constitutionally protected right. Proceeds of the tax are deposited into the Gun Violence Prevention and School Safety Fund, a dedicated fund that redistributes revenue derived exclusively from Second Amendment activity to a variety of the State’s preferred political initiatives.
Plaintiffs’ Core Second Amendment Theory
Plaintiffs anchor their claim in the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which supplies the controlling two-step text-and-history framework for evaluating all government burdens on the right to keep and bear arms. At step one, Plaintiffs contend that acquiring firearms and ammunition is conduct squarely covered by the Second Amendment’s plain text. The right to “keep and bear Arms” would be largely hollow without the ability to obtain arms in the first instance; as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, the Second Amendment right to possess and carry weapons “wouldn’t mean much without the ability to acquire arms.” Because the State’s excise tax directly burdens the acquisition of protected firearms and ammunition—it applies at the point of retail sale and to no other category of goods—it implicates conduct the Second Amendment’s plain text presumptively protects.
At step two, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that taxing the acquisition of arms is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Plaintiffs contend the State cannot satisfy that burden. The historical record from the founding era and Reconstruction reveals no widespread, representative tradition of imposing selective excise taxes on the purchase of arms. Colonial and early American governments relied on the armed citizenry and encouraged arms acquisition; they did not single out arms sales for punitive levies designed to discourage exercise of the right. The absence of historical analogs is dispositive under Bruen.
Plaintiffs further ground their claim in the broader constitutional principle, confirmed repeatedly by the Supreme Court, that government may not single out the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right for special, discriminatory taxation. The Second Amendment, as the Court has held, is not a second-class right subject to an entirely different body of rules than other Bill of Rights guarantees. If the First Amendment bars the government from levying a tax that targets the press or religious exercise for disfavored treatment, the Second Amendment compels the same result when the government taxes the acquisition of arms.
Historical Record
To establish the absence of any historical tradition justifying AB28, Plaintiffs present evidence drawn from the Founding period and the Reconstruction era—the two historical periods the Supreme Court has identified as most probative of the Second Amendment’s original public meaning. That record reflects a consistent pattern of laws directed at the misuse of arms, the keeping of the peace, and the punishment of actual disorder, not at discouraging or financially penalizing the acquisition of arms by peaceable, law-abiding citizens.
Plaintiffs also challenge the constitutional significance of the tax rate itself. The State may be tempted to characterize an 11-percent levy as “modest,” but Plaintiffs invoke the Supreme Court’s recognition that once government is conceded the power to single out a constitutional right for special tax consideration, there is no principled limit on the amount of the tax that may be imposed. A State permitted to tax firearms purchases at 11 percent faces no constitutional obstacle to taxing them at 50 percent, or 100 percent, or beyond—a result that would effectively price the right to keep and bear arms out of existence for ordinary working Californians. The constitutional prohibition on discriminatory taxation of a fundamental right is therefore categorical, not subject to a proportionality or balancing inquiry.
Argument
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the ground that no material fact exists and that the law entitles them to prevail as a matter of constitutional law. AB28 fails at both steps of the Bruen analysis.
Plaintiffs further argue that even setting aside Bruen’s text-and-history framework, the excise tax is independently unconstitutional under longstanding Supreme Court precedent prohibiting the government from singling out the exercise of a constitutional right for discriminatory taxation.
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that California Revenue and Taxation Code section 36011 et seq. is unconstitutional on its face as violating the Second and Fourteenth Amendments; a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the statute and the collection of the 11-percent excise tax from licensed firearms dealers, manufacturers, and ammunition vendors; and a refund of all excise taxes paid by Plaintiffs Poway Weapons & Gear, Inc. and SGR Ventures LLC (d/b/a Sacramento Gun Range) under the unconstitutional statute, whether paid before or after the filing of the complaint.
