By Dave Workman
Editor-in-Chief
In a 5-4 split decision, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled Thursday that two convictions for driving under the influence within seven years can result in the loss of Second Amendment rights in a case known as Geoffrey G. McLellan and Jackson W. Holloway v. Nicholas W. Brown.
In their dissent, four state high court justices say the decision goes too far and violates the Second Amendment.
The state law, passed in 2023, disarms recidivist drunk drivers. McClellan and Holloway were denied applications for concealed pistol licenses because of multiple DUI convictions within a seven-year period.
As reported by the Center Square, “Firearm rights can only be restored after a petition is filed following five consecutive years of ‘law-abiding behavior in the community.’”
Writing for the majority, Justice Steven González stated in his 14-page ruling, “Taken together, our nation’s history of limiting the firearms rights of those who have been convicted of serious crimes and those who have a history of dangerous use of intoxicants, such as repeatedly driving while under the influence, is sufficient justification for the regulation here. We hold that the State has shown RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D)’s temporary disarmament of recidivist drunk drivers is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of disarming groups of people presenting a special danger of misuse.”
In his conclusion, which was joined by Justices Barbara Madsen, Colleen Melody, Raquel Montoya-Lewis and Debra Stephens, González wrote, “Under the Second Amendment, the temporary firearm prohibition for recidivist drunk drivers in RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D) is constitutional without an individualized assessment of McLellan’s or Holloway’s dangerousness.”
Madsen retired two months ago and has since been replaced by Theodore Angelis, the Center Square noted.
The 21-page dissent, authored by Justice G. Helen Whitener and joined by Justices Charles Johnson, Sheryl Gordon McCloud and Salvador Mungia, calls the statutory gun prohibition for repeat DUI violations “an outlier,” which “violates the respondents’ constitutional rights under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”
Justice Whitener amplified the dissent by noting, “The State is depriving individuals of their Second Amendment constitutional right to bear arms before they commit a violent crime on the assumption that one day they might. The Second Amendment does not permit such preventative action.”
Earlier, she observed, “We are not asked to decide whether mixing alcohol and firearms is dangerous. It clearly is, but that is not the case before us. Early laws aimed to prevent harm caused by current intoxication like DUI laws required refraining from driving and only until a person was no longer intoxicated. While early alcohol-and-firearm laws focused on controlling the threat of imminent harm by forbidding access to weapons over a very short period, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a)(i)(D) restricts access to firearms for five years without a finding that the individual poses or would ‘pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another.’”
The Second Amendment was incorporated to the states via the 14th Amendment in the 2010 case of McDonald v. City of Chicago, a case brought by the Second Amendment Foundation—coincidentally based in Bellevue, Wash.—and the Illinois State Rifle Association.
